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Abstract
Recent privacy scandals such as Cambridge Analytica and the Nightingale Project show that 
data sharing must be carefully managed and regulated to prevent data misuse. Data protection 
law, legal frameworks, and technological solutions tend to focus on controller responsibilities as 
opposed to protecting data subjects from the beginning of the data collection process. Using a 
case study of how data subjects can be better protected during data curation, we propose that a 
co-created  data  commons  can  protect  individual  autonomy  over  personal  data  through 
collective curation and rebalance power between data subjects and controllers.
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Introduction
Rapid technological innovation in our data-driven society (Pentland, 2013) has changed how 
data subjects (those about whom personal data are collected), interact with data controllers 
(those who collect and determine what these data are used for). Privacy scandals such as 
Cambridge Analytica secretly harvesting 50 million Facebook profles to build models to 
influence elections1, widespread personal data sharing in the Google Nightingale Project2, and 
the intrusion of private life3 and society4 have made individuals more cautious about the 
information that they put online. However, data subjects are often left out of the conversation 
with regards to data protection (protecting data subjects’ personal data in relation to the 
processing of data, where processing refers to any operation or set of operations which is 
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, 
such as collection, storage, or use). While certain laws and technologies attempt to encourage 
data subject participation and provide them with the ability to control their personal data, this is 
insuffcient as it relies on data subjects having a high-level of understanding of both the law and 
the resources available for individual redress. Moreover, such redress usually arises after data 
collection and sharing, after which time the damage may already have been done.
In this paper, we introduce a new framework, the data commons for data protection, in an 
attempt to improve data subject participation in the data protection process through 
collaboration and co-creation. The paper is outlined as follows. First, we explore the challenges 
facing data subjects who feel helpless as a result of the increasingly sizeable data controllers who 
collect, process, and share their personal data. We identify some of the solutions to this problem 
and also explore how these may be inadequate. We then introduce the commons as a potential 
framework for bridging the data protection divide, before detailing data curation as a use case 
for the data commons, examining what similar frameworks have been established in this space 
and how our data commons can aid better data protection for data subjects. Finally, we 
conclude that a co-created data commons can protect individual autonomy over their personal 
data through collective curation and rebalance power between data subjects and controllers, 
establishing the requirements of a data commons to help data subjects and explore how this 
could work in the context of data curation.
The Data Protection Divide
Under existing legislative frameworks and the available technological solutions, data protection 
focuses on putting responsibilities on data controllers and enforcement. However, this continues 
to place pressure on individual data subjects to protect their own personal data and seek 
individual remedies in case of breaches, rather than including them in discussions that can help 
shape data protection policies and better protect personal data.
1 Revealed: 50 million Facebook profles harvested for Cambridge Analytica in major data breach 
<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-
election>, accessed 15 December 2019
2 I'm the Google whistleblower. The medical data of millions of Americans is at risk 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/14/im-the-google-whistleblower-the-
medical-data-of-millions-of-americans-is-at-risk>, accessed 15 December 2019
3 The House That Spied on Me <https://gizmodo.com/the-house-that-spied-on-me-1822429852>, 
accessed 15 December 2019
4 China’s "Social Credit System" Has Caused More Than Just Public Shaming (HBO) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dkw15LkZ_Kw&>, accessed 15 December 2019
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The Law and Legal Frameworks
Laws such as the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California 
Consumer Privacy Act attempt to rebalance power between data subjects and data controllers. 
As European legislation is already in effect, we focus our work on the regulation and supporting 
information rights relating to the protection of personal data. The GDPR came into force on the 
25th May 2018, introducing signifcant changes by acknowledging the rise in international 
processing of big datasets and increased surveillance both by states and private companies. Data 
subject rights offered by the GDPR include the right of access (Article 15), the right to be 
forgotten (Article 17), and the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated 
processing (Article 22). The GDPR has also clarifed the means for processing data, whereby if 
personal data are processed for scientifc research purposes, there are safeguards and 
derogations relating to processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientifc or 
historical research purposes or statistical purposes (Article 89), applying the principle of purpose 
limitation (Article 5). Information rights such as the right to access to recorded information held 
by public sector organisations through the Freedom of Information Act and intellectual property 
rights offered under the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market can support data 
protection for data subjects in offering greater transparency and alternative remedies to issues 
relating to personal data.
However, even with legal protection, data subjects continue to be relatively powerless when 
exercising their rights against the increasingly sizeable and international data controllers 
(Edwards, 2019). Although people are more aware of their data subject rights, these are not well 
understood (Norris et al., 2017). Only 15% of EU citizens indicate that they feel completely in 
control of their personal data (Clusters et al., 2019). Evaluating location-based services, 
Herrmann et al. (2016) found that individuals do not necessarily know all the inferences that are 
made using their data and thus do not know how they are used. Importantly, individuals are 
unaware of, and unable to correct, false inferences, making the collection, transfer, and 
processing of their location data entirely opaque. With privacy policies written in legalese and 
privacy-protecting options hidden beneath “dark patterns”, data subjects cannot easily fnd out 
how their data are reused, aggregated, and anonymised to make decisions about them (Utz et 
al., 2019). Additionally, laws focusing on placing data protection responsibilities on data 
controllers and empowering enforcement bodies assume that data controllers understand how to 
implement those responsibilities and that enforcement is successful. Data protection offcers’ and 
authorities’ enforcement practices are inconsistent and unclear due to lack of guidance (Norris et 
al., 2017). Data controllers responding to GDPR Article 20 right to data portability requests 
provided a large variation of fle formats that were not all GDPR compliant and confused the 
right with other data subject rights (Wong and Henderson, 2019). Kamarinou and others (2016) 
found inconsistencies in detail and lack of transparency about third-party storage and the 
processing of personal data of cloud service providers’ in their terms and privacy policies. 
Funding for data protection authorities may also be limited, especially in comparison to the 
large multinational corporate data controllers. For example, the Irish Data Protection 
Commission was only given 27% of its requested increase by the Irish Government, totalling 
€21.1 million, despite increased responsibilities post-GDPR (The Irish Times, 2019).
Other legal frameworks have also been considered as a means to protect data subjects. Data 
trusts have been proposed as a legal framework for data stewardship and data management 
(Open Data Institute, 2019). A data trust is a legal structure that facilitates the storage and 
sharing of data through a repeatable framework of terms and mechanisms. Data trusts aim to 
overcome diffculties for data sharing and assure the credibility, trustworthiness and reliability of 
the resulting data analysis (Pinsent Masons, Queen Mary University, and BPE Solicitors, 2019). 
A data trust aims to respect the interests of those with legal rights in the data, ensure that the 
data is used ethically according to the rules established by the data trust, and collectively 
manage individual rights and interests. A key feature of data trusts is that they create rules to 
govern data sharing where a custodian or steward makes decisions on behalf of data users and 
subjects. However, this may still leave data subjects out of the data protection process. Without 
direct data subject engagement, decisions are made on their behalf by trustees as opposed to 
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with them, representing the data trust and not the data subject. Data trusts also maintain data 
protection enforcement issues as it relies on the trust to respond to such challenges, delegating 
data protection responsibilities (Open Data Institute, 2019). A data trust could in theory respond 
to certain data subject rights, but it would be diffcult to mandate rights to portability, access, 
and erasure that rely on the data controller (Delacroix and Lawrence, 2019). An alternative 
mechanism that takes this into consideration is data collaboratives that focus on harnessing 
privately held data towards the public good through collaboration between different sectors5. 
However, individuals and groups of data subjects are still excluded from participation where 
they are only the potential benefciaries and are not part of designing the data collaborative 
framework. A report by Pinsent Masons, Queen Mary University, and BPE Solicitors (2019) 
suggests that both legal reform in data protection and technical considerations should be used to 
ensure that a suitable framework preserves the core rights of data subjects and balances the 
society benefts from data sharing against the interests of the data subjects. Although data 
protection law and other legal mechanisms provide data subjects with data subject rights and 
legal protection, data subjects are only seen as benefciaries of these frameworks and not active 
participants or contributors to the practices for protecting their personal data.
Technological Solutions
New technologies have also attempted to give users the ability to control their own data. Some 
tools include Databox6 (a personal data management platform that collates, curates, and 
mediates access to an individual’s personal data by verifed and audited third party applications 
and services) and Solid7 (a decentralised peer-to-peer network of personal online data stores that 
allows allow users to have access control and storage location of their own data). Other 
applications attempt to facilitate data reuse with privacy-by-design built in, such as the Data 
Transfer Project8 (an open-source, service-to-service platform that facilitates direct portability of 
user data), OpenGDPR9 (an open-source common framework that has a machine-readable 
specifcation, allowing data management in a uniform, scalable, and secure manner), and Jumbo 
Privacy10 (an application that allows data subjects to backup and remove their data from 
platforms, and access that data locally). While these tools are useful if they offer controls that 
limit the processing of personal data according to data subject preferences, it results in the 
responsibilisation of data protection from data controllers to data subjects. Existing tools assume 
that data subjects have a high-level understanding of the data subject rights they have, framing 
privacy as control and placing individual onus on data protection. It also requires data subjects 
to trust the companies and the technological services they provide. Further, these solutions do 
not offer means for collaborative data protection where information gathered from individuals 
could be shared amongst each other. This disenfranchises data subjects from each other and 
prevents them from co-creating data protection solutions together through their shared 
experiences.
Finding a Co-Created, Collaborative Solution
While law and technology separately attempt to address some of these concerns, they may 
inadequately protect personal data because they rely on a high-level of understanding of both 
the law and the resources available for individual redress, usually after data collection. Focusing 
on individual protection assumes that data subjects have working knowledge of relevant data 
protection laws (Mahieu, Asghari, and van Eeten, 2017), access to technology, and that 
alternatives exist to the companies they wish to break away from (Ausloos and Dewitte, 2018). 
5  Data Collaboratives <http://datacollaboratives.org/>, accessed 15 December 2019
6 Databox <https://www.databoxproject.uk/>, accessed 15 December 2019
7 Solid <https://solid.inrupt.com/>, accessed 15 December 2019
8 The Data Transfer Project <https://datatransferproject.dev/>, accessed 15 December 2019
9 OpenGDPR <https://github.com/opengdpr/opengdpr>, accessed 15 December 2019
10 Jumbo Privacy <https://www.jumboprivacy.com/>, accessed 15 December 2019
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Individuals are unaware of how their data are being used after it is collected and are 
disempowered from the data sharing process as they cannot identify the data controllers to 
exercise their rights against. Without a data breach, individuals do not know who else is affected, 
what data controllers and processors are using their data, or how to organise collective action to 
strengthen their argument for recourse. Even when notifed, data subjects rely exclusively on 
data protection authorities to fully enforce the law on data controllers. Data subjects lack a 
meaningful voice in creating solutions that involve protecting their own personal data. As a 
result, although legal and technological mechanisms are being implemented to address existing 
data protection issues in our data-driven society, the focus on individual protection, asymmetry 
of information, and the power imbalance between data subjects and data controllers make it 
diffcult for data subjects to engage with the data protection process.
The Commons for Protecting Data Subjects 
Given the limited ability for data subjects to voice their concerns and participate in the data 
protection process, we posit that the protection of data from harms resulting from mass data 
collection, processing, and sharing could be improved by involving data subjects in collaboration 
and co-creation.
A framework that considers individual and group collective action, trust, and cooperation is 
the commons, developed by Elinor Ostrom in her seminal work ‘Governing the Commons’ 
(1990). The commons itself guards a common-pool resource that may be over-exploited to 
depletion. A common-pool resource (CPR) refers to a natural or man-made resource system that 
is suffciently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential benefciaries 
from obtaining benefts from its use. Ostrom created a commons framework that depends on 
human decisions and activities, and management of the CPR according to the norms and rules 
of the community autonomously (Ostrom, 1990). The commons then represents a CPR for 
transparency, accountability, citizen participation, and management effectiveness, where ‘each 
stakeholder has an equal interest’ (Hess, 2006). A central part of governing the commons is 
recognising polycentricity in decision making, a complex form of governance with multiple 
centres of decision-making, each of which operates with some degree of autonomy (Ostrom et 
al., 1961). The commons framework respects the competitive relationships that may exist when 
managing a CPR. Its success relies on stakeholders entering into contractual and cooperative 
undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms to resolve conflicts (Ostrom, 2010). The 
norms created by the commons are bottom-up, as illustrated by Ostrom’s case studies of 
Nepalese irrigation systems, Indonesian fsheries, and Japanese mountains. The structure of 
these commons has enabled communities to fnd stable and effective ways to defne boundaries 
of a common-pool resource, defne the rules for its use, and effectively enforce those rules 
(Ostrom, 2012). 
From these case studies, Ostrom identifes eight design principles that mark a common’s 
success (Ostrom, 1990):
1. Clearly defined boundaries: Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw 
resource units from the CPR must be clearly defned, as must the boundaries of  the 
CPR itself;
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions: Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of  
resource units are related to local cognitions and to provision rules requiring labour, 
material, and/or money;
3. Collective-choice arrangement: Most individuals affected by the operational rules 
can participate in modifying the operational rules;
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4. Monitoring: Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriate behaviour, 
are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators;
5. Graduated sanctions: Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be 
given assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of  the 
offence), from other appropriators, by offcials accountable to these appropriators, or by 
both;
6. Confict-resolution mechanisms: Appropriators and their offcials have rapid 
access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between 
appropriators and offcials;
7. Minimal recognition of  rights to organise: The rights of  appropriators to devise 
their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities; and
8. For larger systems, nested enterprises for common-pool resources: 
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance 
activities are organised in multiple layers of  nested enterprises.
Ostrom’s design principles are important in the process of the common’s lifecycle, where the 
limitations of the commons and regulation of CPR can iterate within changes to stakeholders as 
part of the collective governance process.
Co-creation and Collective Action within a Data 
Commons
Using the theory and principles of the commons, we suggest that a commons for data 
protection, a “data commons”, can be created to allow individuals and groups of data subjects 
as stakeholders to collectively curate, inform, and protect each other through data sharing and 
the collective exercise of data protection rights.
In a data commons, the common property is personal data from data subjects that are used 
for a specifc purpose, and the framework incorporates existing legal and technological 
structures as well as data subject input and preferences. As personal data are aggregated and 
used to generate economic value (Singh and Vipra, 2019), data protection should move the 
focus away from individuals and towards groups, ‘from processes of consumption to those of 
citizenship and accountability’ (Taylor, 2017). Diaconescu and Pitt (2017) identify the need to 
build ‘pro-social socio-technical systems’ to better balance transparency and privacy, where 
identifed pathologies stem ‘from regulatory choices and associated power struggles’. The data 
commons aims to help contextualise privacy beyond control and move towards privacy as ability 
and as a state, enabling a mechanistic expectation that addressing differences will make more 
people comfortable with the same technologies through relationships of respect (Shklovski, 
2019). Our data-driven society has also become one that has privacy dependencies, where one 
person’s privacy is implicated by information revealed by others (Barocas and Levy, 2019). The 
data commons builds upon existing group theories on the risks involved in public use of 
anonymised personal data (Floridi, 2017) and the necessity for collective rights (Raz, 1986) both 
before and after data are collected. A data commons encourages iterations of individual and 
group data protection objectives that can be different, personalised, and change over time 
(Making Sense, 2018). Figure 1 shows how data subjects are the focal point of the data 
commons, while other stakeholders are bound by the data subject’s desire for better protection 
of their personal data. Within the framework, the data subject should also be able to interact 
with data controllers, data managers, researchers, and civil society for better data protection 
outcomes. A data commons developed using Ostrom’s design principles is useful because of the 
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vast number of stakeholders that have a diverse set of opinions, problems, and preferences on 
how the data subjects’ personal data are managed.
While some data commons have been established in context of data and research archives, 
they focus on increasing the distribution of data rather than on data protection. Local and 
international attempts have been made to further open science and open access initiatives 
through creating research data commons. For example, the Australian Research Data 
Commons11 (ARDC) is a government initiative that merges existing infrastructures to connect 
digital objects and increases the accessibility of research data. The National Cancer Institute 
(NCI) also has a Genomic Data Commons (GDC) that is used to accelerate research and 
discovery by sharing bio-medical data using cloud-based platforms. In Europe, the European 
Open Science Cloud12 (EOSC) is a Europe-wide digital infrastructure set up by the European 
Commission for research, with the aim to simplify the funding channels between projects. The 
EOSC was inspired by the F.A.I.R. principles, representing Findable, Accessible, Interoperable 
and Reusable data sharing and aims to become a ‘global structure, where as a result of the right 
standardization, data repositories with relevant data can be used by scientists and other to 
beneft mankind’ (EOSC European Commission, 2019). While these frameworks recognise that
 
Figure 1. In a data commons (green), the data subject is at the centre. In this framework, the 
data subject and their personal data is the most important, and other stakeholders are 
only considered in context of the data subject’s data protection. The different 
stakeholders represent the polycentricity of all the systems which have influence over 
data subjects.
11 Australia Research Data Commons <https://ardc.edu.au>, accessed 15 December 2019
12 European Open Science Cloud <https://ec.europa.eu/research/openscience/index.cfm?pg=open-
science-cloud>, accessed 15 December 2019
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the information and knowledge are collectively created, their implementations are hierarchical 
and top-down without input from archive participants or repository managers. Additionally, 
existing commons and data commons frameworks do not protect the personal data within them 
as they prioritise data sharing over data protection, particularly on data curation and reuse. The 
EU frameworks acknowledge the GDPR as the source for the right to data protection under the 
law, however it is currently unclear as to how it is implemented.
Other applications of data commons include smart cities. Governments have used commons 
principles to take more responsibility over its citizen’s personal data (Decode European 
Commission, 2018). These include the Bristol Approach city commons13, the Barcelona City 
Council Digital Plan14 and Data Commons15, and the Commons Transition Plan for the City of 
Ghent urban commons16. However, smart city frameworks often rely on dynamic consent 
(Teare, 2019) and informed consent (Mikkelsen et al., 2019). As suggested in the previous 
discussion, the lack of knowledge and understanding of data protection by data subjects limits 
their ability to meaningfully consent to the collection, processing, and result of their personal 
data. Data subjects are also only able to make their decisions based on information that is 
provided to them and have no information as to the dataset they may be a part of. A data 
commons framework for data protection can move beyond those of existing research- and smart 
city-focused commons, applying Ostrom’s theory so that data subjects can co-create the data 
protection responsibilities alongside data controllers, data managers, researchers, and civil 
society. 
Building upon general principles of existing data commons such as the Data Biosphere 
(Denny et al., 2017) on a modular, community-driven, open, standards-based governance and 
the National Library of Medicine (NLM) on the necessity for security, searchability, 
standardisation of metadata, and the management of access control (Brennan, 2018), a data 
protection-focused data commons can serve as a technical solution within data protection legal 
structures. Unlike existing research data commons frameworks that focus on the dissemination 
of data and increased funding opportunities for research, a data commons for data protection 
focuses on data subjects to further their ability to protect the processing of their personal data. 
The framework can be used to balance the protection of the rights of data subjects with 
safeguarding the scientifc process and integrity of research results for researchers during the 
data curation process. A data commons is useful because mechanisms such as licensing for data 
archives may not be useful for data protection even if they limit forms of data reuse (Guadamuz, 
2006). For a data archive data commons, the data subject can better maintain control over their 
data through the research process (Powell, 2015) and reduces the risks of personal data being 
misused, with severe repercussions to the data subject. This is especially important when curated 
data that used to be in the public domain no longer are, with wider ramifcations if the data are 
socially and politically sensitive, such as Twitter data on the 2014 Hong Kong Umbrella 
Movement (Tromble and Stockmann, 2017). While digital data archives aim to preserve, reuse, 
and promote ethically sound, methodologically well-grounded research, there continues to be 
insecurity by researchers about data sharing, where social media data sharing may become 
hidden and informal (Weller and Kinder-Kurlanda, 2017). A data protection-focused data 
commons applied to data archives of curated data could also help clarify who the data 
controllers are from a wide range of archive owners, dataset owners, or participants, identifying 
who is accountable to and for the publicised data and the resulting reuse outputs. Without a 
data commons, questions such as ‘Who maintains control over curated data?’, ‘How can data 
controllers limit who and how collected data is reused?’, and ‘How can data subjects exercise 
13 The Bristol Approach <https://www.bristolapproach.org/>, accessed 15 December 2019
14 Barcelona City Council Digital Plan 
<https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/digital/sites/default/fles/LE_MesuradeGovern_EN_9en.pdf>, 
accessed 15 December 2019
15 Barcelona Data Commons <https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/digital/en/blog/ethical-and-
responsible-data-management-barcelona-data-commons>, accessed 15 December 2019
16 Commons Transition <https://commonstransition.org/commons-transition-plan-city-ghent/>, 
accessed 15 December 2019
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their data protection rights when sensitive and identifable personal data that could potentially 
be deanonymised is curated?’ remain diffcult to answer. With a data commons, existing 
standards and review mechanisms such as research ethics board reviews, funding body 
requirements, and institutional policies can be integrated into the data commons, acting as the 
frst level of safeguard for data protection for data subjects in the future. Researchers that work 
in data curation and examine data protection practices on archive data reuse can offer privacy 
principles for individuals and organisations to adhere to. Although ethics approval may be 
granted by institutions, if the research data reuse by third parties is granted, the participant as 
the data subject may not know what stakeholders have access to their personal data and for 
what purpose. In cases where ethics approval is dubious, researchers may take their work 
outside of institutions and use data subjects’ personal data in commercial ways, as in the case of 
Cambridge Analytica. This can be mitigated with a data commons where future researchers 
looking to use the data archive can utilise it to see what data limitations have been discussed and 
Figure 2. In a data commons (green), the data subject specifes to what extent they would like 
their data to be protected based on existing conflicts and challenges pre-identifed 
within the data commons for the use case (red). No prior knowledge of existing law, 
norms, or policies are required. Along with stakeholder information (blue), the data 
subject specifcation is then used to inform their data protection outcome that is 
generated from the system. As the outcome is data subject-centred, decisions ensuring 
the protection of the data subject's personal data may override existing preferences, 
policies, or standards set by other stakeholders. Data subjects can return to and 
review their outcome, add their data subject experiences to the data commons, and 
participate in the co-creation process at any time.
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set by data subjects, proceeding with reuse if those requirements are met. Collective 
participation by different stakeholders further allows research participants to assess these forms 
of use and curate the data archive data for themselves, engaging with their own research 
interests while participating in the community interest. The data commons acts as a new means 
for data management where the reasons for use, limitations on reuse, and recourse after data are 
aggregated and anonymised are all contained within one ecosystem.
To implement  a data commons, various legal and technological components  need to be 
created for stakeholders  to be engaged. Figure 2 shows how a data subject specifes to what 
extent they would like their data to be protected based on existing conflicts and challenges pre-
identifed within the data commons for the use case. In addition to data subject preferences,  
using information such as data controller policies, research papers, and input from civil society, 
a data subject specifcation is created and used to inform their data protection outcome that is 
generated from system. For example, the data subject-centred outcome could ensure that the 
data subjects’ archive data are only to be reused by the researchers and data managers directly 
associated to the archive within the data commons and not by specifc external researchers. The 
archive researchers would automatically be notifed of the data subject’s preferences. This allows 
the data subject to set their own limitations of how their data are used as opposed to it being 
decided by the archive itself.  As the outcome is  data subject-centred,  decisions ensuring the 
protection of  the data  subject's  personal  data may override existing  preferences,  policies,  or 
standards set by other stakeholders. Data subjects can return to and review their outcome, add 
their data subject experiences to the data commons, and participate in the co-creation process at 
any time. Data controllers can address new risks before collecting data, minimise the potential 
for data breaches, and meet stakeholder demands. Other stakeholders, such as researchers and 
civil  society,  can  participate  in  the  data  commons  to  make  the  data  sharing  process  more 
transparent,  support  exercising  group  rights,  and  provide  information  and  standards  for 
FAIRsharing (Sansone et al., 2019). These requirements aim to decrease the power imbalance 
between data subjects and controllers. Mapping out the development of a data commons into 
Ostrom’s CPR design principles, a data commons will be clearly defned based on its use case, 
where each stakeholders’  role is  detailed.  All  data subjects that would like  to fnd out more 
information about  the  use  case,  contribute,  or  co-create  are  free  to  participate  in the  data 
commons. Any bad practices, unethical behaviour, and data breaches will be identifed by the 
data commons system, with the remedies updated as stakeholders respond. Data subjects and 
other  stakeholders  can collaborate  and establish  their  own norms,  such as  co-creating data 
sharing practices which promote data protection by design and facilitate data reuse for data 
research projects amongst a group of researchers. 
Data Commons for Data Curation
We now outline data curation of public data archives as a use case for the data commons, assess 
how a data commons could address stakeholder issues by increasing accountability for data 
subjects’ personal data, encourage collaborative curation, and allow for data protection to be an 
iterative process.
Using the Umbrella Movement as the use case for a data curation data commons, created at 
the beginning, the framework allows potential research participants as data subjects to see what 
and how their data will be shared with data controllers and researchers, raising and addressing 
any concerns respectively. Applying Ostrom’s design principles, the data commons for data 
curation will have clearly defned boundaries as to the kinds of data and metadata it will archive 
and when such archival will cease. In this example, data subjects would like to publicise their 
experiences from the Umbrella Movement on a platform in the public domain. To participate, 
the data subject can identify the most applicable data commons by searching for keywords such 
as social media, data curation, research data, and data reuse. The identifed data commons 
would include information about data controller policies on personal data, research and 
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archiving, other data subjects’ experiences and outcomes from exercising their data subject and 
information rights, recent news and scandals on data controllers, and expert and researcher 
fndings from their work based on relevant topics and tags. This allows the data subject to 
identify what settings there are for preferences such as limiting the audience, how information 
can be published in public and in private, whether data can be deleted, how published 
information could be used (by who, how, and the process), what intellectual property policies are 
for the published information, and how other data subjects felt about the platform’s responses to 
information rights based on their experiences. 
Without a data commons, the data subject would have to search for this information 
independently, looking for forums for information. After identifying the most relevant 
framework, Twitter for example, based on different stakeholder knowledge, the data commons 
uses the information and prompts the data subject to select a few preferences by answering 
questions based on the conflicts and challenges that have arisen from them. These questions 
could include ‘Do you want your data or posts to be publicly archives? Available to 
researchers?’, ‘If your data or posts were deleted at a later date would you want to notify 
researchers of such request, for example to not include your data in future studies?’, ‘Do you 
want a mechanism to hide all or some of your data and posts?’. 
Based on the data subject’s responses to those questions, the data commons chooses 
platform settings and data actions for the data subject that best aligns to their aims. These may 
override platform policies based on data subject requests. For example, during the Umbrella 
Movement, Twitter decides to change its historical archive policy regarding the removal of 
deleted tweets. This would be automatically reflected in the data commons through technical 
means, notifying the stakeholders in the system. Although Twitter automatically removes 
deleted Tweets from its data archive, if a data subject would like for that information to be kept 
in certain pieces of work, researchers have a right to retain such data until further notice by the 
data subject. Requests by data subjects could be specifc such as any Tweets that include the 
term ‘Umbrella Movement’ can be kept while ones with ‘universal suffrage’ or ‘Hong Kong 
independence’ can be removed. 
Researchers would be notifed of these preferences. The system can then be updated to 
match personal preferences with secondary resources to create a more comprehensive picture of 
what preferences data subjects would collectively like with regards to data curation, sharing, and 
reuse. Experts such as Tromble and Stockmann can advise data subjects on what they can do in 
light of new policy changes as well as data controllers on how to address any concerns raised. 
Even without misuse and with GDPR Article 17 right to erasure, certain forms of data 
archival and curation can make removing personal data diffcult, particularly if such data has 
already been reused in research. If Twitter suffered from a data breach and released the 
personal data of data subjects during the Umbrella Movement, in a data commons, the breach 
can be addressed by supporting data subjects in exercising the right to erasure and sending 
notifcations to data controllers to request their data be removed. Researchers who have used 
the affected datasets and data would also be prompted of the breach and be required to issue 
corrections in their work and remove identifable data in relation to the data subject from their 
data archives should the right to erasure be exercised. Automatic detection of subsequent attacks 
caused by the data breach can also prompt the system to alert and support data subjects to 
exercise their data subjects rights if they haven’t already as well as look for new alternative 
platforms that better support data protection practices. 
In deciding the best platform and settings for the data subject’s purpose of broadcasting the 
Umbrella Movement, further advice is also provided on how data from the data subject can be 
best protected. This includes: setting up an account with a disposable email, having an 
anonymous platform username, setting up tools that can automatically delete the data subject’s 
posts, links to how to exercise information rights on the platform, and the successes and failures 
of other data subjects in this regard. This information is saved in the data commons and is 
accessible by the data subject at any time. Any information that the data subject has gathered 
can also be put into the data commons.
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By applying Ostrom’s principles to a data curation data commons, established 
methodologies and organisational structures are built into the data protection-focused 
framework while enabling individuals and groups whose data form part of the datasets to 
determine how their personal data are used. A data commons framework enables data 
protection because it operates as a polycentric system, working in tandem with data protection 
law and policy, data subjects and their rights, data controllers, data managers, and researchers 
to develop a better understanding of how personal data can be protected. The data commons 
simplifes the data protection rights procedure by including information, instructions, and 
templates on how rights should be collectively exercised, giving data subjects and opportunity to 
engage with and shape data protection practices that govern how their personal data is 
protected.
Conclusion and Future Work
To overcome the limitations of laws and technologies in protecting group data, we propose a co-
created data commons to maintain individual autonomy of personal data. Identifying 
requirements for the data commons based on Ostrom’s framework on the commons, the data 
commons supports more accountable data protection practices, collaborative data management, 
and data sharing for the beneft of data subjects and data controllers. Applying the data 
commons to the use case of data curation, and specifcally to the collection and repurposing of 
Twitter data of the 2014 Hong Kong Umbrella Movement, we have shown how this framework 
could assist data subjects in limiting and preventing the misuse of identifable public, sensitive 
personal information. The data commons encourages the co-creation of data protection for data 
subjects while also allowing them to participate in shaping how other stakeholders manage their 
personal data.
Future work can use the data commons requirements established in this paper to build a 
prototype of a data commons for data archival and data curation. In order to assess whether a 
data commons is useful to data subjects, technical and non-technical requirements should be 
developed to identify what stakeholders should be involved and what data could be incorporated 
into the system. Surveys and interviews could be conducted to data subjects to identify the issues 
that the data commons could prioritise in helping them achieve the data protection they want. 
Experts can also provide input on what they believe are factors that support a successful data 
commons based on their knowledge of other commons frameworks. Further, the data commons 
should be built based on the principles of the GDPR such as data protection by design and by 
default (GDPR Article 25), where users can be anonymous in the data commons and any data 
included should be pseudonymised unless explicitly allowed to be identifable by the data 
subject. With the use of Ostrom’s commons framework to develop a data commons, a prototype 
could be built to test the feasibility of the system in tackling stakeholder issues.
To conclude, in this paper, we established a framework for a co-created data commons that 
can rebalance power between data subjects and controllers. By including wider stakeholder 
participation such as researchers and civil society, the polycentric system places the data subject 
in the centre, supporting data subjects from the beginning of the data protection process, prior 
to any data being collected. Acknowledging the legal mechanisms and technological tools 
available to data subjects in protecting their personal data, the data commons not only 
incorporates existing data protection safeguards but also takes into consideration the needs of 
the data subject as the fundamental means to protect individual autonomy over their personal 
data through collective action and co-creation.
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